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Omar Bakri in the Early 1990s
Omar Bakri is a well-known name in Britain due to the great exposure he has received in print media and national television, and currently he is in Lebanon, after being exiled from the United Kingdom a few years back. In this article we want to give some brief and concise details regarding this man, his cult and the nature of their current activities. This is not intended as a detailed discussion of this man as such, but our focus is simply to highlight the aspect of the transition in aqidah orientations of the cult of Omar Bakri for the sake of camouflage, warding off criticism and political expediency.
Omar Bakri came on the university scene in the early 1990s where he was traveling frequently to the universities in London and the South of England. In those days Bakri was propagating the Mu'tazili aqidah, and he remained upon this for most of that decade. Propagation of innovatory creeds would only be natural for an ignoramus who never studied with any scholars and faked his credentials. Bakri is from the generality of the Leninist Kharijites and Leninist Takfiris of the 20th century that were spawned from the 1960s Communist Revolutionary doctrines penned by Sayyid Qutb in his Milestones and az-Zilal (see a detailed article on that here), and which became the spring and fountain for all subsequent takfiri-revolutionary movements. This ideology also penetrated the arena of Jihad, that's the subject of another article.
Mu'tazili Creed is a Hindrance to the Bakri Cult
The Bakri Cult found a great deal of opposition and polemic against them during this period in the 1990s and their views on certain issues such as whether aahaad hadeeth amount to knowledge, and affairs of creed such as the punishment of the Grave were damaging to them. Unable to defend this baatil in part, Bakri began proclaiming repentance from his doctrines and attachment to the Salafi aqidah by the turn of the century. This was without shaking off the Leninist-Takfiri-Revolutionary manifesto that is common to all 20th Century Kharijites.
Transformation and Camouflage
This signaled a change in the direction of al-Muhajiroon. Whereas in the 90s you saw these people clean-shaved, working as lawyers or as professionals in other industries, wallowing in their Irjaa', (many of them not even establishing the five daily prayers, and engaged in much major sin openly, despite "working to establishing a khilaafah"). They were claiming in those days that since there is no khilaafah then then many of the obligations of Islaam were not binding. This was the same doctrine of Sayyid Qutb who did not used to attend Jumu'ah prayer because of the absence of the khilaafah as is reported about him through first hand witness of Alee al-Ashmaawee. As the ideology of Hizb ut-Tahrir is pretty similar to that of Sayyid Qutb, then they shared the same perception towards these religious obligations.
But all of this was detrimental to the da'wah of these people so the appearance of these people slowly began to change. You can't be taken seriously by the Muslims and you can't poison them with your poison with that type of appearance and while your actions do not conform to the ideals you are seen to be promoting. This was common observance from these people in the 1990s.
So the Bakri Cult went through a transition or transformation. After the turn of the century, they began appearing with their thawbs, dressing and appearing like adherents to the Sunnah, and they slowly began to shake off that I'tizaali baggage that was keeping them in the dregs. On the organizational level, they also started appearing under different names and labels, all of which would appeal to Muslims desiring the Sunnah. So we saw the names "Ahl us-Sunnah wal-Jamaa'ah" and "al-Firqat un-Najiyah" (the Saved Sect) and "al-Ghurabaa" (the Strangers) and more recently they are have openly come out, fraudulently, in the name and banner of "Salafiyyah".
Understanding the Character of Omar Bakri
In 2005 Omar Bakri was deported from Britain to Lebanon. When the war in Lebanon broke out in 2006, and British nationals were being given a route home through British ships, Bakri was observed on national television begging to be allowed back into Britain. Whilst in Britain, Omar Bakri was the "eyes and ears" of the Muslims, and his cult and his organizations would approach Muslims through psychological methods by which they used the sympathy of Muslims towards Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine and the likes, and beautified slogans pertaining to the Muslim Ummah, to win them over to their vile form of insidious partisanship.
However, coming back to this incident, when Bakri was begging to be allowed back into Britain, fleeing from the breakout of aggression in his land only confirms much of what we have said elsewhere, that you have to really look at the characters of these people to understand the nature of these individuals we are dealing with - in which you see blatant hypocrisy (in action). And then when you criticize these people, and describe them as they are, it is as if you are an enemy of Islam and the Muslims, as if these people represent Islam and the Muslims in the first place. They only represent their own groups, and their own agendas and their own partisanship and their own innovated methodologies.
But You Still Can't Hide
Nowadays, these people (the Bakri Cult) operate heavily online with particular focus on the Tube, through multimedia presentations, and recorded video lectures, attempting to deceive other Muslims with their claimed attachment to the way of the Salaf. You will come across these people lecturing on "Ascription to the Salaf" and speaking on particular aspects of the Salafi creed, and refuting some of the sects of innovation, and they steal or plagiarize much of the information from the Salafi websites, so they can show to the people that they have scores of articles in defence of the aqidah, refuting the saying of the creation of the Qur'an, speaking of the tribulation of Imaam Ahmad, refutation of the Ash'aris and so on. And this connection to the aqidah is inasmuch as it allows them to assume some credibility in their attempts to poison other Muslims with their real agenda - inviting to their cult and their hizbiyyah, to frightening people away from the true and real scholars and instead to direct them to disgraces such as Omar Bakri and his likes.
Despite all of this activity, it is a rule that if you are concealing an innovation or deviation, then you will not be able to hide it for long. It will certainly be exposed in your speech, or in your companionship, or in your actions, or allegiance and so on. And the greatest of the giveaways against the Bakri Cult is that they continue upon their Leninst-Marxist Revolutionary Manifestos, following on from that movement of Takfir in the 1960s itself resulting from the notions of "social justice" coming from 20th century ignoramuses writing about Islam after having "gulped down" Western Materialistic Philosophies for 15 years of their lives. These doctrines continue to manifest from these people (the cult of Omar Bakri) and it is essentially what their call is based around. For this reason, they are easily recognizable, no matter how much camouflage and obfuscation they try to create, at some point or other, they have to express the innovation they are calling to in reality, and express their resentment and hatred of the Scholars, Takfir of the Scholars and Takfir of Rulers and of Muslim nation-states, they have to express their Qadari-I'tizali outlook through their calls for revolution (ideologically or otherwise).
The methodology that Hizb ut-Tahrir and al-Muhajiroun were implementing in the 1990s and which they learned from an-Nabahani has three phases:
This is simply another adaption of the "Revolutionary Vanguard" in Qutb's Leninism that was penned by Qutb in the late 1950s and early 1960s in his works Milestones and also in az-Zilaal (see here). And al-Muhajiroon and Hizb ut-Tahrir are still upon that today. There were no real significant differences between Hizb ut-Tahrir and al-Muhajiroon except on the issue of where should the "khilafah" be established, should it be only in the Muslim lands, or can it be called for even in non-Muslim lands? So they differed on this matter and few other minor matters.
Compared to the 1990s, the Bakri Cult learned, after the turn of hte century, that to be able to penetrate people with their call, ascription to Sunnah and Salafiyyah was necessary because the 1990s Mu'tazili background was a severe hindrance, was not really getting them anywhere, and brought too much criticism that discredited the political aspects of their call (which is their primary call).
The Bakri Cult Finds Supporters from the Extremist Qutbiyyah
It should be no surprise that the Bakri Cult - represented in Hizb ut-Tahrir and al-Muhajirun and their various present-day camouflages - should find the most extreme of the Qutbiyyah here in the UK inclining towards co-operation with them, since after all, they all drink from the same fountain.
In short, the Bakri Cult still operates today under many camouflages (names and labels), and most of their activities, and their presentations of themselves are geared towards deflecting criticism for themselves so that they can continue their insidious call which is still what it was in the 1990s, namely (straight out of the 1848CE Communist Manifesto of Marx and Engels):
Nurturing individuals in private upon the ideology of the cult (the underground stage), then with sufficient followers, bring it out in the open (the open calling stage), and then hope to initiate a general revolution (the inevitable confrontation) through which the khilaafah can be established.
Except they lack the intelligence to realize that short of hot air, there's not much else they are going to produce, because utilizing the manifestos of 19th and 20th century secular atheist Jews to stage revolutions (including Rafidi ones) is not from the Shar'iyy asbaab in rectifying the servant or the land, and where these methods have been implemented (1960s Egypt, 1980s Syria, 1990s Algeria), there was no khilaafah established, it turned out "social justice" was nowhere to be seen amongst the 150,000 or so dead men, women and children whose lives were wasted therein, and since the actual condition of the people (as it relates to what is between them and Allaah) did not fundamentally change from what it was and tend towards:
Then the only recompense was either a taaghoot worse than the previous one, if not a seasoned, well-experienced, revolution-hardened taaghoot even more intent in defending the realm and crushing the slightest whisper of antagonism than ever before.
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